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   Abstract 
China has long represented a puzzle for scholars of democracy, who view political trust as an 
important indicator of regime legitimacy. Previous studies show that while democracies around the 
world experienced declining levels of political trust, the authoritarian Chinese government maintained 
unexpectedly high levels of trust. Using World Value Survey (WVS) data over a critical twelve-year 
period (2001-2012) and multilevel modeling techniques, we explore both macro- and individual-level 
determinants of political trust in China. We find that province-level economic performance and 
individual level income combine to influence political trust. Higher levels of individual-level income 
have a positive effect on trust in more developed provinces but the opposite effect in less developed 
provinces. Furthermore, individuals living in provinces with higher levels of inequality and openness 
tend to be less trusting of government. Our study offers critical insights not only for political trust in 
China but also the country’s political future. 
 
 
 Keywords:  China, political trust, economic development, income inequality, economic openness 
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How has China’s rapid economic growth influenced its citizens’ overall trust in their 
governments?  Over the last decade or so, several studies documented that China enjoyed 
unexpectedly high levels of political trust while many democracies experienced declining political 
trust (Wang 2005, 2007; Yang and Tang 2010; Chen and Shi 2001; Wong et al. 2011; Norris 2011; Li 
2012).  The World Values Surveys (WVS) reveal that political trust in China was not only 
significantly higher than in democracies but also remained relatively stable over time, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Given that trust in government, or political trust, is considered a critical indicator of regime 
legitimacy and often linked to democratic governance (Newton 2007; Zmerli and Van der Meer 
2016), the roots of China’s high political trust levels continue to puzzle scholars.  Despite suspicion 
over the trustworthiness of the survey results and speculation that respondents might feel pressured 
Figure 1. Aggregate Political Trust in China across Time 
 
Note: The chart depicts the grand mean of political trust in China over time. Political trust measures individuals’ mean confidence 
level in the following political institutions: the legislature, the central government, the army, the police and the civil services.  
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to report higher levels of political trust in an authoritarian country, little evidence from previous 
studies shows support for these misgivings (see Newton 2001; Shi 2001).1  In the curious case of 
China, answers have often focused on Chinese government’s remarkable economic performance as 
well as the role of a government-controlled media and education system (Li 2012; Wang 2007; Chen 
et al. 1997; Yang and Tang 2010; Wong et al. 2011; Kennedy 2009). Prior studies have primarily 
concentrated on using individual characteristics to explain political trust at the national level in China.  
Although China has witnessed tremendous changes in various aspects of its economic, social and 
political landscapes since the 1980s, few studies have examined the influence of these structural 
changes on citizens’ attitudinal changes. In addition, most studies only consider a simple linear 
relationship between income and political trust and overlook potentially more complex relationships 
between individual income, macro-level economic performance and trust.  
In this study, we argue that China’s robust economic growth could indeed boost Chinese 
citizens’ trust in their government but the relationship might be more nuanced than previously 
suggested. We assert that the various negative consequences associated with development, such as 
rising income inequality and regional imbalance in development, could erode Chinese citizens’ 
support for their government (Li 2012; Wedeman 2005; Gustafsson et al. 2008). In addition, 
increasing openness likely brought liberal political thoughts pertinent to political freedom, human 
rights and democracy to Chinese citizens, possibly resulting in shifts in their political attitudes. To 
date, no one has systematically examined how these structural changes in China has influenced its 
citizens’ political attitudes while accounting for regional differences. To fill in this gap, we collect 
data on these contextual variables at the provincial level, merge them with the individual-level public 
opinion data for a critical time period from 2001 to 2012 and examine their influence on individual 
political trust.  
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Our results reveal that rural-urban income inequality and economic openness both erode 
trust in government and the relationship between provincial-level economic development and 
political trust is conditional upon one’s individual income. Out of the three macro-level economic 
indicators, we find that per capita income and openness have large effects but rural-urban inequality 
also has a sizable influence on political trust. Our results suggest that Chinese citizens maintain a 
high level of political trust because the negative effects of inequality and openness have been largely 
offset by the strong positive effect of economic growth. However, no economy can expect to grow 
indefinitely. Economic slow-down, particularly an economic crisis, will likely result in a sharp decline 
in Chinese political trust as government performance fails to match citizen expectations.2 Given that 
openness remains the second strongest predictor of political trust and China has become 
increasingly open over time, Chinese citizens will be increasingly exposed to alternative political 
thoughts and ideologies that will, consequently, alter Chinese citizens’ expectations of their 
governmental institutions and possible decrease their trust in government. Therefore, in order to 
maintain domestic political stability, the Chinese government must begin to tackle the inequality 
issue and adopt deeper political reforms.  If left unaddressed, these two issues themselves may serve 
as the basis for a series of challenges from their own citizens regarding the governing legitimacy of 
the current regime. 
In the sections that follow, we first introduce a multilevel theoretical framework.  We 
propose some prominent province-level determinants of political trust in China, namely economic 
development, inequality, and openness. Based on these theoretical propositions we derive several 
hypotheses. In the following sections, we introduce our data and methods used to test the 
hypotheses and present the major findings.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the results and 
their policy implications for China’s political future. 
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THE MULTILEVEL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL TRUST  
 Trust is an important element of political and social life in a society (Uslaner 2002).  Often 
described as an enduring value because of its stability over time (see Knack and Keefer 1997), 
political trust is important to state functioning and is often considered an important attitudinal 
indicator of regime legitimacy (Mishler and Rose 2001; Hetherington 2005; Hutchison and Johnson 
2011; Johnson and Hutchison 2012; also see Warren 1999).3   
 Despite its importance to regime legitimacy, cross-national studies of political trust have 
observed a troubling but consistent pattern of declining political trust levels across advanced 
industrial societies (Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2011).  Although 
cultural shifts (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and changes in media (Norris 2000) are 
among the most notable reasons proposed by previous research, Dalton (2004) contends that the 
trend is also likely due to changing citizen expectations and more diverse policy demands on 
government.  In many developing countries where citizen expectations and policy demands are 
lower, overall political trust levels remain significantly higher compared to their more advanced 
counterparts, including China (see Norris 2011).  These general global patterns in political trust over 
time suggest that China’s rapid economic development may increase citizen expectations and 
jeopardize the current high levels of political trust over the long run. 
 Typically conceptualized as an individual’s confidence in their government institutions, 
political trust is based in part on personal characteristics and dispositions in conjunction with their 
assessment of institutional performance (Norris 1999, 2011; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; 
Newton 2007). Although political trust tends to be more enduring within countries over time, it 
varies considerably across countries leading Newton (2007: 205) to state that political trust is “a 
reflection of the external or objective conditions” rather than simply reflecting an individual 
disposition (also see Knack and Keefer 1997; Newton 2001; Uslaner 2002). Thus, the primary 
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antecedents of individual political trust tend to be multilevel, shaped by both individual 
characteristics and contextual macro-level factors (Zmerli and Newton 2008; Newton and Zmerli 
2011; Hutchison and Johnson 2011).  Similarly, within countries, political trust can also vary 
considerably across regions with the variation largely attributable to differences in contextual factors 
rather than differences in individuals (Johnson and Hutchison 2012).   
 The causal mechanisms for political trust are complex.  In previous research exploring the 
micro-foundations of political trust, one of the primary questions examined is whether political trust 
is a feature of the individual or a feature of the object.  Increasingly, scholars have concluded that 
the answer is both. At its core, political trust is a relationship between the subject (the individual) 
and the object (political institution) shaped, in part, by the subject’s disposition toward trust in 
general and their assessment of the object’s performance (see Zmerli and Van der Meer 2016).  The 
interplay between these two elements primarily shapes individual trust in political institutions. As we 
discuss below, in this study, we largely focus on controlling for individuals’ trust disposition using 
common individual-level predictors of political trust and evaluate macro-level indicators of regional 
institutional performance shaping the assessment component of political trust decisions within 
China. At the province-level, we identify three important economic indicators relating to 
institutional performance—economic development, economic inequality, and openness. 
Individual- level  Determinants of  Political  Trust  
The first component of political trust, the subject’s disposition toward trust, is commonly 
viewed an underlying orientation shaped by certain personality traits. Prior studies suggest that 
cultural values and norms play an important role in shaping individual political trust (Almond and 
Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Shi 2001; Welzel et al. 2003; Dalton and 
Ong 2006; Yang and Tang 2010; Welzel 2011; Shin 2012). Considering the strong influence of 
Confucianism and communitarianism in China, we expect to find individual dispositions tapping 
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into these unique Chinese cultures, such as one’s tendency to respect the authority and generalized 
trust, have a stronger influence on political trust in China than in other countries (Shin 2012).4  
 We anticipate the effect of other individual characteristics to largely conform to the patterns 
found in other countries and regions, particularly those characteristics not directly linked to regime 
type or culture. For instance, we anticipate that socioeconomic factors and politically neutral 
attitudes and dispositions, such as economic satisfaction and national pride, will perform similarly in 
the Chinese context. We have included detailed explanations of these individual characteristics in the 
online appendix.  
Province-level Determinants of Political Trust 
 A critically important component of political trust - an individual’s assessment of the object’s 
performance - is essentially an individual’s evaluation of political institutions based, in part, on how 
well performance matches expectations (Jennings 1998; Dalton 2004; Norris 2011). This assessment 
process is heavily influenced by objective indicators of governmental performance (i.e. macro-level 
conditions). Typically, governments with higher performance are more trusted in comparative 
studies as individuals tend to trust governments that provide adequate services, are generally fair and 
competent, and maintain economic prosperity (Rothstein 2011; Uslaner 2011).  
Economic Performance 
The link between economic performance and political trust has been studied extensively, 
particularly in North America and Europe, with much of previous literature linking better economic 
performance results to higher political trust levels.  Indeed, researchers examining political trust in 
China have documented economic performance as the single most important predictor of political 
trust in China (Chen et al. 1997; Wang 2005; Yang and Tang 2010; Wong et al. 2011). China’s 
economy has grown immensely since the “open-up reform.”  With an average growth rate of 10% 
for the past three decades, China has not had a major economic downturn yet (as shown in the chart 
	7 
	
of Figure 2). Yet, the reform featured early policies that opened up “special economic zones” on the 
east coast with tax exemption and subsidies to attract foreign investment, resulting in rapid 
economic development in the east coast and the West inland relatively poor and undeveloped.5  
 
 
 
The map in Figure 2 demonstrates the imbalance of economic development across Chinese 
provinces. Considering the strong connection between economic development and political trust 
and the large regional variation in economic development levels, we expect individuals residing in 
more prosperous provinces to have a higher level of political trust.  
H1 a:  Individuals in provinces with a higher average income will be more trusting government than 
individuals in provinces with a lower average income. 
 
Unlike previous literature suggesting a linear relationship between economic performance 
and political trust, we contend that individual income levels may moderate the effect of province-
level economic performance on political trust in China. Indeed, previous studies reveal a more 
complex relationship between individual-level wealth and trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2005).  In 
their study on the Dominican Republic, Espinal et al. (2006) find that the poorest and wealthiest 
individuals exhibited the highest levels of political trust, suggesting that the relationship between 
Figure 2. Economic Development in China 
 
Note:  Data on national and province-level read GDP per capita are collected from the China Statistical Yearbooks. 
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income and trust is not linear. Given that political trust has a strong evaluative component, 
province-level wealth may shape the expectations of economic performance of individuals residing 
in that region. While we still anticipate stark differences in overall trust levels between relatively 
wealthy and relatively poor provinces, we expect to find variation in trust levels across income 
groups between relatively wealthy and relatively poor provinces. We argue that wealthier individuals 
may have higher expectations of economic performance in their home province. Thus, wealthier 
individuals should be more trusting in wealthier provinces where the economic performance has 
matched their expectations (see Catterberg and Moreno 2005).  However, in relatively poor districts, 
we contend that they may exhibit lower trust compared to poor residents given this disconnect 
between expectations and province economic performance. Based on this conditional effect, we 
develop a second hypothesis:  
H1 b:  The effect of province-level wealth on political trust will vary across individual income groups. 
 
   
Economic Inequality 
Since the 1980s, China has experienced one of the largest increases in inequality in the world 
(Yang 1999), mainly manifested as enlarging rural-urban disparities (Kanbur and Zhang 1999).  The 
Chinese government gave priority to the development of industry over agriculture in the early stages 
of the open-up reform.  Heavy taxation and administrative fees were levied from agriculture to 
subsidize industry in urban areas (Kim 2010). Such policies directly led to the impoverishment of 
peasants in rural China. A German ambassador stationed in China once vividly commented on the 
polarization between the “thriving cities” and “impoverished countryside” in China by saying that 
“the urban area looks like Europe and rural area looks like Africa in China” (Xue 2013: 4).  
The household registration (Hukou, or 户口 in Chinese) system further deteriorated the rural-
urban disparity by segregating rural and urban residents. Impoverished peasants in China were 
locked in rural areas because “rural residents not registered in the cities could not enjoy urban 
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lifestyles, housing, education, employment, welfare, retirement pension, etc.” (Xue 2013: 4). The 
chart in Figure 3 shows that the income ratio between the average urban and rural residents 
increased drastically from 1996 to 2003 and then stayed relatively stable and decreased somewhat 
after 2008.6 The map shows regional variation in urban-rural inequality across Chinese provinces.  
 
 
 
We expect rising inequality to have negative effects on individual political trust, because 
sharp income inequality can be perceived as a policy failure. From a psychological standpoint, rising 
economic inequality could cause the feeling of relative deprivation, i.e., a discrepancy between what 
individuals anticipate receiving and what they actually get, resulting in frustration, anger, and 
dissatisfaction against the regime (Gurr 1970). When a handful Chinese cities and a small proportion 
of the population became much better off than the rest of the country, the majority of the 
population might feel relatively deprived and less trusting their government. The negative 
relationship between inequality and political trust has been consistently observed in cross-national 
studies (see Anderson and Singer 2008; Kumlin 2011). Based on this proposition, we develop the 
following hypothesis.   
Figure 3. Economic Inequality in China 
      
Note:  Data on national and province-level urban-rural inequality are collected from the China Statistical Yearbooks. 
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H2:  Individuals in provinces with higher urban-rural inequality will be less trusting of government 
than individuals in provinces with low levels of inequality. 
 
Openness 
Higher levels of openness could erode political trust by increasing citizens’ expectations for 
institutional performance. Since the open-up reform China has become increasingly accessible to the 
rest of the world. Openness has introduced liberal political thoughts pertinent to freedom of speech 
and association, human rights, government transparency, and democracy to China, resulting in 
waves of requests for political liberation by the Chinese people.7 Surprisingly, few studies have 
examined the effect of openness on individuals’ attitudinal changes in China. We consider the 
varying degrees of openness across Chinese provinces and study its effect on political trust. As 
shown in Figure 4, we observe that China has been increasingly open to foreign countries, but the 
degree of economic openness varies across Chinese regions.8  
 
  
 
While the Chinese government tries to cultivate a positive self-image among its citizens 
through censorship and propaganda, individuals living in provinces with higher levels of openness 
will be more likely exposed to alternative information sources. In particular, we expect that exposure 
Figure 4. Openness in China 
   
Note:  Data on % of foreign enterprise employees at the national and province-level are collected from the China Statistical Yearbook. 
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to alternative information sources pertaining democracy, government transparency, human rights 
and freedom of speech will result in individuals holding higher expectations for their governments in 
these areas. Therefore, we expect individuals residing in provinces with greater openness more likely 
to critically assess their governmental institutions and, subsequently, less trusting of their 
government than those residing in more closed provinces.  
H3:  Individuals in provinces with high levels of openness will be less trusting of government than 
individuals in provinces with low levels of economic openness.   DATA,  VARIABLES,  AND METHOD 
 
 To test our hypotheses, we use a unique dataset combining province-level data collected in 
China and World Values Survey (WVS) data disaggregated across provinces and time.9  The WVS is 
one of the few cross-national surveys that measures political trust levels in a consistent manner over 
the span of decades allowing us to examine trends over time.  With multiple surveys conducted in a 
wide range of Chinese provinces, the WVS also allows us to examine trust at the regional level.  That 
said, the China surveys in the WVS do suffer from both sampling inconsistencies and incomplete 
geographic coverage of the entire country.10  In particular, the sampling framework for the 2001 
WVS survey was more urban-biased than the 2007 and 2012 waves, which used more representative 
sampling strategies.11  To ensure that these changes in sampling procedures do not significantly 
change the results presented below, we re-estimated our models without the 2001 survey as a 
robustness check.  These results are presented in Table A1 of the online appendix, and the 
substantive findings reported here remain unchanged.   
Dependent Variable 
Our primary dependent variable is an index of political trust comprised of multiple 
indicators on a broad range of institutions intended to provide a generalized measure of trust in 
government (also see Norris 2011). More specifically, we construct our measure by using the 
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individuals’ mean assessment of the following political institutions:  the legislature (National People’s 
Congress), the army, the central government, the police, and the civil services.  For each indicator, 
respondents report their degree of confidence or trust along a four-point scale that ranges from 0 
(no trust) to 3 (high trust).    
It is worth noting that previous cross-national studies suggest that there may be two 
different dimensions of political trust: policy/decision-making institutions and security/social order 
institutions (see Inglehart 1997; Norris 2011).  However, Norris (2011) finds this distinction only 
holds for older liberal democracies and this dimensionality was not evident for the rest of the world.  
Therefore, we emulate Norris’ (2011) measure focused on capturing a broad assessment across 
several dimensions of government because we are trying to evaluate individuals’ political trust in 
general and not just one particular sector or institution (also see Hutchison 2011; Hutchison and 
Johnson 2011; Zmerli and Van der Meer 2016).    
The principle component factor analysis for our item index also does not indicate that the 
Chinese respondents differentiated the security and decision-making institutions along different 
dimensions.  The Cronbach’s Alpha score for the simple additive index of these indicators is 0.82.  
Factor analysis revealed that all of the variables had an average loading of 0.67.  Furthermore, a 
factor score generated from this loading correlated with our measure at 99%.  While we are 
confident that aggregating our indicators into a broad measure of political trust, we re-estimated our 
models substituting a three-item index that excluded trust in armed forces and police for our 
dependent variable as a robustness check.  These results are presented in Table A2 and Figure A1 of 
the online appendix, and the substantive findings reported here remain unchanged. 
Province-level  Independent Variables   
 Average Income.  We include the province-level real per capita income as a macro-level 
variable for economic development in the province. We expect province-level development has a 
	13 
	
positive effect on individual trust in government, and that this relationship is conditional upon 
individual income. Data on real per capita income at the provincial level are collected from the 
Chinese Statistics Yearbooks.  
 Economic Inequality.  We include the ratio of real per capita income in urban and rural 
areas as a measure of economic inequality. We expect that a higher level of urban-rural disparity in 
the province will lower its citizens’ political trust. Data on rural and urban per capita incomes are 
collected from the China Statistics Bureau.  
 Openness.  We argue that Chinese nationals living in more open provinces tend to be 
more critical of their government. We include % of employees working in foreign enterprises out of 
all employees in the province as a measure of openness. We expect this variable to have a negative 
effect on political trust. Data on this measure are collected from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks.12  
  We have also included two macro-level control variables-education rate and media density.  
There has been a wide range of research linking individual media exposure to lower political trust in 
democracies (e.g. Norris 2000; Hutchison 2011; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Chen and Shi (2001) 
find that the news media in China have negative effects on people's attitudes toward political 
institutions in general and make people distrust government. They suggest that the saturation of 
official propaganda makes people think more about the messages and compare them with the 
political reality, and further discredit the information source (Chen and Shi 2001). Additionally, news 
media now not only cater to political dictates but also “the wants and needs of increasingly 
diversified and sophisticated audiences. Formerly forbidden areas such as societal news, human 
interest news, and critical reports have frequently been explored” (Chen and Shi 2001: 92). Citizens 
exposed to a more open and free media are more likely to evaluate the political reality and also be 
more critical of government. Following their insight, we include the number of newspaper and 
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magazine subscriptions per 10,000 persons in each province as an indicator of media exposure. We 
choose newspapers and magazines because they are a highly censored media type in China.  
Given that education plays an important role in political trust, we examine how province-
level education levels influence individual trust in government in addition to one’s individual-level 
education level.  We argue that the overall regional education level could also influence trust in 
government through socialization. If an individual socializes with mostly highly educated individuals, 
he or she might be more critical of the governments. Given that higher educated citizens tend to be 
less trusting of government, we expect that higher levels of province-level education should have a 
negative influence on individual political trust. We include the percentage of provincial population 
that only completed the nine-year compulsory education but without any further education as a 
measure of overall  education rate. Data on both macro-level controls are collected from the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook.  
Individual- level  Variables 13 
 We account for important individual-level predictors of political trust in the analyses in order to 
avoid serious omitted variable bias, and we use relatively standard individual-level model of trust similar to 
previous research in non-North American or European contexts (Hutchison 2011; Hutchison and Johnson 
2011).  However, due to space considerations, detailed descriptions of the individual-level control variables 
can be found in the online appendix. 
 
STATISTICAL METHOD  
 Since our explanatory variables involve both individual- and province-level factors and we 
employ survey data over a course of 12 years, our data present several methodological challenges.  In 
this case, individuals are nested within surveys conducted throughout different Chinese provinces 
(spatial) at different points in time (temporal). To determine if multilevel modeling techniques are 
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necessary, we first estimate a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with survey year and region 
random effects to assess the degree to which variation in political trust is due to variation across 
individuals within regions and time versus variation between regions and time.  In Table 1, the 
intraclass correlation indicates that 6.8% of the variation in political trust is due to variation across 
regions and time, which is to be expected, since we have hundreds of individuals across 19 regions 
over three points in time.  Since the intraclass correlation here is not 0, evaluating the effect of 
environmental conditions on individual-level behavior by using spatial differentiation (i.e., countries, 
regions and states) and temporal differentiation (Snijders and Bosker 2012) is appropriate.14    In the 
models below, we also report additional intraclass correlations to show how much unexplained 
variation between surveys is accounted for when we introduce our individual-level predictors and a 
full macro-micro-level random intercept model.    RESULTS  
 In Table 1, we present three multilevel political trust models using our political trust index. 
Model 1 offers the individual-level model to serve as a baseline for evaluation of the province-level 
factors affecting political trust.  In Model 2, we incorporate our independent variables along with 
our two province-level control variables, education rate and media density, to the baseline model to 
jointly evaluate their independent effects in a full additive model.   
 We begin with the baseline model, Model 1, in which we estimate the effects of key 
individual-level predictors on political trust. In general, all the individual-level variables except 
individual income achieve statistical significance and influence political trust as expected.  In 
particular, we find that individuals who exhibit higher levels of economic satisfaction, political 
salience, and national pride are more trusting of government, while the highly educated tend to be 
less trusting their government (also see Dalton 2004; Shin 2012).  Given that we expect a conditional 
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effect between individual income and province-level wealth, the parameter estimate for income is 
not surprising.  As expected, individuals with higher tendency to respect the authority and 
generalized trust are more trusting the government. Additionally, the ICC coefficient indicates the 
Model 1 offers a noticeable improvement in accounting for unexplained variance across the 
surveys.15  In short, nothing in Models 1 indicates that individuals in China are qualitatively different 
from those in other countries or regions with respect to their individual-level antecedents of political 
trust.   
 In Model 2, we introduce our province-level variables on economic development, inequality, 
and openness in order to assess their effects on political trust. Consistent with our hypotheses (H1a 
and H2), our results show that Chinese citizens in wealthier provinces have higher levels of overall 
political trust while those residing provinces with greater economic inequality are less trusting of 
government.16  We also find support for our contention (H3) that greater openness negatively affects 
political trust.  Finally, the ICC correlation for Model 2 (.047) indicates a significant improvement of 
goodness of fit for the data in comparison to the one way ANOVA (.068) and Model 1 (.061).17 
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 To provide some sense of the substantive impact that our key independent variables have on 
political trust, we plot all of their unconditional effects side-by-side in Figure 5 based on the Model 2 
Table 1:  Effect of Contextual Factors on Political Trust across Chinese Provinces, 2001-2011
Ind iv id ual-Le v e l
Social Trust  .09** (.02)  .09** (.02)  .09** (.02)
Economic Satisfaction  .02** (.00)  .02** (.00)  .02** (.00)
Politics Salient  .12** (.02)  .12** (.02)  .12** (.02)
Respect for Authority  .05** (.01)  .05** (.01)  .05** (.01)
National Pride  .13** (.01)  .13** (.01)  .13** (.01)
Age  .00** (.00)  .00** (.00)  .00** (.00)
Education -.07** (.01) -.07** (.01) -.07** (.01)
Income -.00 (.02) -.00 (.02) -.04* (.02)
Female  .04** (.01)  .04** (.01)  .04** (.01)
Pro v in c e -Le v e l
Average Income  .006** (.001)  .005** (.001)
Economic Inequality -.09** (.04) -.09** (.04)
Openness -4.1** (1.34) -4.1** (1.32)
Income x Average Income  .001** (.00)
Education Rate -.65* (.35) -.66* (.34)
Media Density -.30** (.10) -.27** (.11)
Constant 1.45** (.05) 1.88** (.18) 1.92** (.18)
Rand o m  Ef f e c ts  Param e te r
Survey  .01 (.003)  .01 (.003)  .01 (.003)
Residual  .22 (.01)  .22 (.01)  .22 (.01)
In trac las s  Co rre lat io n
O b s e rv at io n s
Province Survey Units
Individuals
* = Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level.  ** = Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.
† The intra-class correlation for the oneway ANOVA is .068.
Note:  Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients estimated using Stata 14, with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Higher values on the following individual-level variables indicate: higher social trust, economic satisifaction, salience of politics, 
respect for authority, national pride, age, education and income levels, and female. 
Higher values on the following province-level variables indicate: higher GDP per capita, urban/rural income gap, 
percentage of foreign enterprise workers inworkforce, percentage of individuals with only a middle school education, 
and ratio of newspapers to total population.
4410 4410 4410
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
.061 .047 .048
57 57 57
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estimates.  Comparing the magnitude of effects between our key independent variables moving from 
their minimum to maximum values reveals that per capita income (panel A) and openness (panel C) 
have the largest substantive effects on political trust.  Although statistically significant, the 
substantive effect of economic inequality is relatively weak compared to the other economic 
indicators suggesting that perhaps the concern over this issue is overstated in the near term.  The 
relatively strong effect of openness in decreasing political trust indicates that factors shaping 
performance expectations exert more influence than some of the actual institutional performance.    
 
Figure 5:  Unconditional Effects of Province-level Economic Factors on Political Trust 
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  In terms of our province-level control variables, we find a negative and statistically 
significant effect of both province-level state-controlled education rates and media density on 
political trust. As postulated, high levels of media density can turn away citizens from trusting their 
governments. Our results indeed show that individuals residing in provinces with higher per capita 
newspaper subscriptions are less likely to trust government. This finding mirrors Chen and Shi’s 
(2001) argument that exposure to propaganda makes the Chinese citizens distrust governments, it 
also echoes previous research linking individual media exposure to lower political trust in 
democracies (see Hetherington 2005). Macro-level education level turns out to have a negative and 
significant effect on political trust as well. This finding shows that not only one’s own education 
level influences their trust in government but that the overall education levels of their more 
immediate environment also shapes their attitudes. In China, we observe that individuals living in a 
more educated province have lower overall levels of political trust.  
 In Model 3, we examine the conditional relationship between province-level income and 
individual income on political trust.   In the previous models, we found no significant relationship 
between individual income and political trust but a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between province-level income and political trust. As we argue above (H1b), province-level wealth is 
likely to affect individuals on both extremes of the income scale in their political trust attitudes 
differently.  Wealthier individuals are less likely to trust government institutions in poorer provinces 
but more trusting in wealthier provinces.  In Model 3, the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that higher province-level wealth serves to raise political trust as individual 
income increases.  The component terms are also statistically significant indicating differential 
effects across individual-income and province-level wealth scales. 
 In Figure 6, we plot how province-level wealth conditions the effect of income on political 
trust in China. While overall trust across all income groups in wealthier provinces is higher than in 
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poor provinces, we also find significant differences between wealthy and poor provinces in which 
type of individuals along the income scale are more or less trusting of government.  In wealthier 
provinces, high-income individuals are more trusting of government than lower income individuals 
while the opposite is true for individuals living in poor provinces.  This finding adds an interesting 
wrinkle to our existing understanding of the relationship between income and political trust.  
Previous cross-national research on trust consistently observed a largely negative relationship 
between income and trust as affluent individuals were less trusting of governments, particularly in 
advance industrial societies (see Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Dalton 2004; Dalton and 
Shin 2006; Shin 2012).  Here we see that, in China, this relationship is conditioned by the province-
level economic conditions. 
 
Figure 6:  Conditional Effect of Province-level Wealth on Political Trust across Income Groups 
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Overall, our analyses examining generalized political trust across Chinese provinces offer 
strong support for our hypotheses.  These findings are consistent with our overall argument that, in 
general, Chinese citizens formulate political trust attitudes at the individual-level and respond to 
contextual factors in a manner similar to citizens in other regions and countries throughout the 
world.  In terms of our contextual, province-level factors, we find very little difference in how 
Chinese citizens respond to economic inequality and wealth than in other regions throughout the 
world.18  What we do demonstrate, however, is that these factors are not evenly distributed 
throughout China, which may contribute variation in political trust levels across the country.   Conclusion 
 
With the world’s largest population, China’s political future still hinges upon its citizens’ 
support for the current government. As Welzel (2006) maintains, democratization research has long 
“downplayed the role of mass attitudes,” for public aspiration for democracy is a strong predictor 
for regime change.  To better understand China’s political future as well as its current government’s 
continued resilience, we focus here on political trust because of its importance as an indicator of 
regime legitimacy (Newton 2007).  Numerous prior studies had documented the extreme high levels 
of political trust in the authoritarian Chinese government (see Li 2012; Wang 2007; Yang and Tang 
2010; Wong et al. 2011). Departing from those national studies, we fully utilize provincial variation 
in various economic indicators to explore the effects of economic structural changes taking place in 
the past few decades on political trust in China. 
By disaggregating World Value Surveys (WVS) data across Chinese provinces over a critical 
time period (2001-2012), our initial exploration has produced several important insights. First, 
economic performance is definitely an important explanation for political trust. Different from 
previous literature, we find that province-level economic performance and individual-level income 
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combine to influence political trust. Wealthy and poor individuals respond to the economic 
performance in their home province quietly differently. In poor provinces, increases in personal 
wealth will reduce one’s political trust and the opposite is true for wealthy provinces.  We also 
observe that various social and political issues that China faces, i.e., rising income inequality, 
imbalance of regional developments, and increasing economic openness, all erode Chinese citizens’ 
trust in their government. Third, when comparing the substantive effects of our province-level 
variables, we find that province-level economic performance, as measured by average income, and 
openness have the largest impact on trust, followed by rural-urban inequality. 
These findings have important implications on China’s political future. So far, China’s 
immense economic growth has played an important role in boosting its citizens’ trust in 
government, perhaps offsetting the negative effects of increasing openness and rising inequality on 
political trust. However, China has shown troubling signals of an economic slow-down. In 2014, 
China missed its official growth target for the first time in the past few decades. Unlike his 
predecessors who always prioritized economic growth, China’s new President Xi Jinping calls for 
“less emphasis on growth and faster structural reform” (The Economist 2015). There is growing 
concern that China might face a major financial crisis in the near future because of the “imbalanced 
growth, government stimulus, overcapacity, an overwrought housing market, and a severely under-
capitalized financial system” (Schuman 2015: 1; Kollewe and Monaghan 2015). Economic slow-
down, particularly an economic crisis, will likely be coupled with rising social unrest and widening 
inequality resulting in a sharp decline in Chinese political trust.  
Since the late 1970s, China has gradually and strategically opened up cities, towns and 
regions from the east coast to west inland.19  Opening up will inevitably expose China to alternative 
political thoughts and ideologies pertinent to democracy, government transparency, human rights 
and freedom of speech/association that will, consequently, alter Chinese citizens’ expectations of 
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their governmental institutions and decrease their political trust. Currently, the coastal provinces 
remain most economically open while the western inland provinces stay relatively closed to the 
global economy. Yet, once most Chinese regions gradually open up to the world, our results suggest 
that there might be a sharp decline in the overall trust in government.  
Overall, our study provides critical insights into the nature of political trust in China, one of 
important sources of regime legitimacy for the current regime.  It also offers important lessons for 
both the Chinese government and concerned citizens. While the Chinese government has been able 
to draw political support from the public by using its robust and growing economy (Shi 2001), the 
sharp gains in economic development may itself alter citizens’ expectations in government and 
increase both the quantity and breadth of policy demand on the political institutions (see Dalton 
2004). Indeed, this pattern echoes those earlier cross-national studies that observed declines in 
political trust among advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2004; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Norris 2011). 
Additionally, the Chinese government should be aware of the limitations of censorship and 
propaganda in cultivating citizens’ political trust. Our results show that both the media and 
education system runs counter its designed purpose of promoting governing legitimacy in China. 
Citizens exposed to an environment with higher levels of education rates and media density are less 
likely to trust their governments. Therefore, in order to strengthen citizens’ confidence in the 
government, China must begin to tackle the inequality issue and adopt deeper political reforms. If 
left unaddressed, these two issues may cause their own citizens to challenge its governing legitimacy.  
Undoubtedly, public opinion research in China is relatively underdeveloped compared to 
North America and Europe so there is still much work to be done in the future.  Our study sets to 
examine the effects of various structural changes on political attitudes in China. This research 
endeavor is especially meaningful considering the unimaginable degree of changes experienced by 
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the Chinese people in their economic, social and political lives. Of course, this study is not without 
its limitations. Compared to an experimental or true longitudinal panel design, we are mindful that 
an observational study like ours cannot offer the same level of causal evidence.  
Yet, our findings may also have some implications for survey studies in China. We think that 
the reported high levels of trust at the national level might be overstated. For example, in all waves 
of the WVS, 10 Chinese provinces were excluded20, and perhaps not coincidentally, all 10 of these 
provinces have high economic inequality levels and six of these 10 excluded provinces are also 
relatively underdeveloped.21 Based on our findings, we reasonably speculate that the inclusion of 
these provinces in the WVS could possibly have resulted in lower national levels of political trust in 
China than currently reported. Given these external validity concerns, we caution researchers using 
these surveys, especially in cross-national studies, from drawing too strong of conclusions from the 
overall national averages.  
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ENDNOTES
																																								 																				
1 One concern of studying political attitudes, such as political trust, in China is the possibility that 
respondents are afraid to be critical of the political system for fear of reprisal or repression. However, Wang 
(2007) suggests that this challenge may be overstated with respect to China (also see Chen and Shi 2001).  He 
observed that Chinese respondents were more than willing to express criticism of their governments. 
Furthermore, as King et al. (2013) show, censorship in China does not typically silence criticism of the 
government and its institutions but is focused on inhibiting mobilization of collective actions.  
2 A similar pattern of declining trust over time among advance industrial societies has been observed 
repeatedly in cross-national studies (see Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 1999, 2011; Dalton 
2004; Dalton and Welzel 2014; Zmerli and Van der Meer 2016). 
3 Newton (2007: 344) argues, overall political trust comes “close to the concept of legitimation, which has 
more profound importance for the system of government than trust in particular political leaders or the 
government of the day.” Trusting individuals can strengthen regime norms and contribute to political stability 
(Newton 2007; Hutchison and Johnson 2011).  
4 Space considerations limit our ability to offer an extended discussion of the ‘Asian Values’ hypothesis, but 
several studies provide a detailed overview of this debate (see Dalton and Shin 2006; Welzel 2011; Shin 2012).	
5 As of today, it is estimated that West China fell behind economically from the East Coast by at least 20 
years. For instance, the three eastern coastal provinces Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong respectively enjoyed 
a per capita income of 52,840 RMB, 51,711 RMB and 44,736 RMB in 2011. Yet, the per capita income for 
the four west inland provinces Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu and Tibet in the same year was only 13,119 RMB, 
15,752 RMB, 16,113 RMB, and 17,319 RMB. 
6 We speculate that the elimination of agricultural taxes in 2007 played an important role in stabilizing the 
urban-rural inequality after 2008.  
7 The “Democracy Wall” and the “1989 Tiananmen Movement” were perhaps the most notable events.  
8  Here we use the percentage of employees working in foreign enterprises as a proxy measure of openness. 
9 The World Values Survey is a global survey project conducted over dozens of countries throughout the 
world and over time.  These data are publicly available and accessed at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  All the 
province-level data were collected from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks (2001-2013) published by the China 
Statistics Bureau, and carefully compiled by the authors.  
10 According the codebook descriptions of the sampling procedures, several ‘remote provinces’ were excluded 
for largely budgetary reasons.  Across the three waves of WVS, the following provinces were omitted from 
our sample due to missing surveys in one or more of the waves.  These excluded provinces include Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Inner Mongolia, and Jilin. 
11 In the 2001 survey, the multistage stratified sample was based on provinces as the initial stratification unit 
with counties and county-level cities serving as the PSUs.  As a result, the overall country sample was smaller 
in 2001, with 25 family households as the basic sampling unit for each province.  The adjustments to the 
sampling framework for the 2007 and 2012 waves were intended to reduce the urban bias of the 2001 wave 
and reduce the disparity in sampling between urban and rural areas with additional stratification.  In 2007 and 
2012, seven general regions served as the initial stratification units with counties and county-level cities 
serving as the PSUs.  Overall, the 2007 and 2012 waves are considered less urban-biased and more nationally 
representative.  For more information about the sampling procedures, please refer to the codebooks available 
at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
12 To alleviate any concerns regarding multicollinearity between our economic variables, we conducted several 
diagnostic analyses and found no evidence of multicollinearity between our variables.  The analyses revealed a 
mean VIF score of 1.91, which is well below the common threshold of 10.  Additionally, the tolerance scores 
and condition numbers for each variable indicate that we do not suffer from multicollinearity problems with 
our economic variables. 
13 Please refer to our online appendix for further details on the multiple imputation procedures for missing 
values among our independent variables.  However, because our imputation model matches our analysis 
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model, we use the unimputed values for our dependent variable to avoid adding more error to the analyses 
below (see Von Hippel 2007). 
14 In the models below, we use a random intercept specification for Models 1 and 2  Because we include a 
cross-level interaction term in Model 3, we use a random coefficient specification that allows the slope of the 
individual-level income variable to vary. 
15 A comparison of the ICC coefficients reveals that Model 1 represents a 10% improvement over the one-
way ANOVA in terms of overall model fit. 
16 An anonymous reviewer suggested that the effect of economic development on political trust may be non-
linear, similar to previous findings at the country-level.  To test this, we conducted several robustness checks 
of Model 2 in which we included squared and cubed terms of our average income variable.  We find no 
evidence that this type of nonlinear relationship exists between province-level economic development and 
political trust within our data.  Although we find no evidence of this effect in our models, we believe this 
difference in effect between county and province-level economic development is noteworthy. 
17 A comparison of the ICC coefficients reveals that Model 2 represents a 31% improvement over the one-
way ANOVA and a 23% improvement over Model 1 in terms of overall model fit. 
18 To determine whether our study suffers from omitted variable bias stemming from factors other than 
economic development and performance that reflect higher quality of governance, we conduct several 
robustness checks to assess whether our results hold after controlling for other measures of government 
quality.  The primary challenge is the lack of indicators disaggregated to the province-level in China.  
Therefore, we use several indicators of China’s overall quality of governance at the national level that change 
over time across our three survey waves: relative political capacity (Kugler et al. 2013), ICRG quality of 
government index (Dahlberg et al. 2016), and the World Bank government effectiveness index (Dahlberg et 
al. 2016).	We find no substantive changes to our key independent variables from the results reported in 
Model 2.  The only notable difference is that the statistical significance level of our province average income 
variable drops from .05 to the .10 in the models controlling for relative political capacity (p=0.053) and the 
World Bank government effectives index (p=0.072).  We present these findings in Table A3 of our online 
appendix. 
19 China gradually opened up cities and regions through four important steps. First, it opened up the five 
coastal cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Haikou) as its “Special Economic Zones” in the early 
1980s. The second step expanded the open-up policy to 14 cities on the east coast. The third step opened up 
three coastal economic belts:  the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and the Southern Fujian Delta 
region. The fourth step opened up dozens of inland cities including those along the Yangtze River, provincial 
capitals, as well as northern and western bordering cities and towns. Currently, cities and towns that are open 
to foreign investment can be found in all Chinese provinces.  
20 Please refer to footnote 10 for a list of the excluded provinces in our analyses.  
21 The following six provinces are underdeveloped and also excluded from WVS: Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, 
Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Jilin.  
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